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To me it seems clear, beyond question, that neither in the Constitution,
nor in the statutes enacted by Congress, nor in the judgments of the Supreme
Court of the United States can there be found any substantial support for
the proposition that, since the adoption of the Constitution, the principles of
the Common Law have been wholly abrogated touching such matters as are
by that instrument placed within the exclusive control of the National
Goverment.
(Judge Shiras in Murray v. Chicago & N. W.
Rly. Co., 62 Fed. 24.)
To whatever has required for its upbuilding the prolonged
activity of countless men, in one generation after another, whether
expressed in unconfined exertion of physical labor which produces
for our astonishment a pyramid, a cathedral, or in endless mental
effort which evolves for our wonder a science, an art, a system of
law, men have always paid respect. As conferred upon a system
of law, that respect has always, in English-speaking countries, been
acorded to the Common Law. Law exists for justice, and Webster
said: "The Common Law is a fcuntain of justice, perennial and per-
petual."
Rightly did he as a representative American pay this tribute, for
to the founders ot this government there never had been another
system of law. They were, in large measure, descendants of those
Englishmen who, centuries back, had ceaselessly petitioned for
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recognition of their rights of person and property; had finally
obtained them, and from that foundation had ever thereafter
through their courts received justice as their due. From an abso-
lute monarchy, at times tyrannical, knowing no government but that
of force, strengthened by feudalism which, by tithes and servitudes
exacted, had stifled individual freedom of action,--they eventually
through public acclaim, the resulting reaction of long-continued
suffering,--aroused the government to consideration of its security
and to the consequent realization that the nation's strength rested
fundamentally in the spirit of the people. From that government
they wrested recognition of personal rights which we have since
cherished as inalienable.
A public spirit founded upon a resolve so unchangeable as to
wrest from an unwilling sovereign a Magna Charta warranted a
student of the time in saying that the rights appealed for rested
universally in men's souls. And so we think to-day. Yet ours is
the benediction of years of judicial construction, both by the Com-
mon Law courts of Great Britain and of this country. These courts
have always applied the original rights broadening their interpreta-
tion and application and evolving a system of law whose just rules
rests immemorable. We reason always in its terms when we apply
the standard of social duty. Common Law is only another name
for common justice.
No tribute can be other than meager to those judges who
through eight centuries have labored almost unerringly to bequeath
us our system of law. It was not easy for the earlier of them to
oppose the will of monarchs. Nor was duty outlined clear without
precedent. We little appreciate their efforts, for to us to-day those
decisions lie plainly in the path of what we please ourselves readily
to discern as their duty. Such precocity presents the fallacy petitio
principii, for we base our determination of their duty on their deter-
mination of such duty as we find it in our present knowledge built
up from the decisions they made. Suffice it to say, that to us, as
lawyers, the Common Law has guarded with its extending arm
rights in instances so varied as to pass our conception of the require-
ments for which passing time makes call upon a system of justice.
As a product of both logic and experience, its rules offer justice to
any situation now to be presented.
Imbued through inheritance with the principles of right and
justice, gained by so much effort by their ancestors, our Fathers
came to this land bringing with them the idea that "governments
are instituted among men deriving their just powers from the con-
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sent of the governed," and continuing their social relations under
the Common Law as they found it applicable to their situation.
Nor is this merely a historical deduction. To the colonists there
was ever present, from their immigration to the founding of the
Government, the great struggle for justice, and the justice they
claimed was that of the Common Law. Edmund Burke, in his
speech on "Conciliation with America," speaking of the interest in
and devotion to the Common Law by the colonists, said: "I hear
that they have sold nearly as many of Blackstone's 'Commentaries'
in America as in England." The Colonial Congress on the 14th of
October, 1774, declared: "That our ancestors who first settled these
colonies were, at the time of their emigration from the mother coun-
try, entitled to all the rights, liberties and immunities of free and
natural born subjects within the realm of England," and "that by
such emigration they by no means forfeited, surrendered or lost
any of those rights," and were, therefore, at that moment "entitled
to the Common Law of England."
By the Ordinance of 1787 there were preserved to the people in
the Northwest Territory the common law rights developed from the
Magna Charta and their enforcement through "judicial proceedings
according to the course of the Common Law." Into the Constitu-
tions of the original thirteen States were incorporated specifically
some of the more important of the great common law principles
commonly designated as "Due Process of Law," "Trial by Jury,"
"Religious Liberty," the "Privilege of Habeas Corpus," "Freedom
of Speech," and the "Right to Assemble and Petition." And in
addition thereto the Constitution of New York, as well as those of
some other States, provided that the common law and statutes then
in force should continue to be the law of the State, subject to such
alterations as the Legislature should make. The Declaration of
Independence reveals, in its every line, a people thoroughly outraged
and indignant because of denials of justice according to the stand-
ards their fathers had helped to make and that they knew so well.
All this proves that uppermost in the minds of the colonists
were these common law principles. Upon these principles they
asserted their right of independence, the right to establish a sep-
arate government, and the right to adopt a constitution. They
knew of no powers to confer upon a Federal government except
those which represented the relinquishment of rights of the States as
understood at Common Law. They intended, therefore, to erect a
government which expressed the ideals of their birthright.
When we take up for construction the Constitutions of the time,
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whether Federal or State, we must have in mind that, then as now,
there was a canon of construction requiring that written documents
must be construed in the light of the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding their making. That rule of construction forbids an in-
terpretation in the light of the present day indifference to, if not
ignorance of, the struggle of the Fathers to secure protection for
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness for themselves and their
descendants, through the establishment of law and its enforcement
by the courts.
Now, other ideas are, temporarily, I hope, in the forefront. We
have so long enjoyed the blessings of a government of law rather
than that of man that we fail to appreciate its value. Many know
historically of the charter granted by William of Normandy in the
fourth year after the conquest,-of the memorable event at Runny-
mede, when on the 15th of June, 1215, King John of England affixed
his signature to the Great Charter there submitted to him by the
militant nobles of his realm,-of the preliminary union among the
American colonies in 1754 and in 1765,---of the protests of the Colo-
nial Congress of 1774,--of the Declaration of Independence,-of
the formation of the constitutions of the original thirteen States
and that of the Federal Constitution,--and of the suffering and loss
of life incident to the struggle to throw off a yoke of bondage that
the ideal of government of law might come into being. But the
underlying reason for it all is not fully appreciated by the great
mass of people. It is not strange that this is so, for generations
of people have come and gone since that period. None of them
having suffered from the oppression of man, they know not of it.
And the leaders of thought and political action who do know, have
found other subjects more interesting, and so have discussed them
to the exclusion of tht great truth often expressed: "Eternal vigi-
lance is the price of liberty."
What the effect has been is well illustrated by a remark made
to me the other day by a business man of more than average intelli-
gence: "The Constitution did very well when it was made, but it is
out of date now and must be ignored when it stands in the way of
things we want." He neither knew nor cared that the Fathers had
provided for its amendment to meet further necessities. He did
not realize that this very Constitution is the charter of the people's
liberties; that through it and through it alone, have the people the
power to check encroachments by the Legislative, the Executive,
and the Judicial departments of the Government, either upon each
other or upon the reserved rights of the people, either as individuals
or gathered into States; that any unrebuked and unchecked attempt
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to exercise powers not granted to a department of the Federal Gov-
ernment is a serious menace to our scheme of government, in that it
creates a precedent which may be taken advantage of later:
But a general discussion of this most important subject is foreign
to my present purpose. That my business friend's echo of the now
time-honored formula: "What is the ConstitutiQn between friends ?"
is more generally shared than thoughtful men carl wish, is evidenced
by the answer to, or rather the failure to answer suggestions openly
and boldly made to practically destroy local State government by
extending through Congressional enactment and judicial construc-
tion the Commerce and Post Road provisions of the Constitution.
So to extend the powers actually granted by the Constitution as to
take away power expressly reserved, to the States or the people,
seems to the unthinking not a deliberate violation of the Constitu-
tion. But they are mistaken. The phrase is a fraudulent one em-
ployed to deceive the people. Its purpose is to hide the real intent
which is to modify the Constitution by other and different methods
than that provided in the Constitution itself, namely, by the action
of the people of the United States. Clearly, then, it is fortunate
that the Common Law rule of construction which has ever been
employed by the courts of this country, both Federal and State,
required the Federal Court to take into consideration when con-
struing the various provisions of the Constitution the circumstances
surrounding and attending its making.
A government of law, not of men, was the aim of the Fathers.
All history-confirmed by some that is very recent and very pain-
ful-had taught them that man cannot be trusted to govern his fel-
low man; that nearly all men in the possession of great power have
favorites to reward and enemies to punish; that equality in enjoy-
ment of life and property, as well as equality of opportunity, are
best secured by sound legal principles administered by judges whose
highest ambition is to work out justice under the law.
They knew what the judges had done in the centuries following
Runnymede. They realized that as a class they had been faithful
to their great trusts, fearing neither the Monarch on the one hand
nor the mob on the other; and that to them the highest of all ideals
had been justice. And, being determined that law and not man
should govern, they made of the judiciary an independent depart-
ment of government, and placed it upon a plane above the control or
reach of either the Executive or the Congress. Never before had
the judiciary in any country been accorded such a strong and inde-
pendent position. And it should be noted that while the Constitu-
tion contains no general grant of legislative power, but instead the
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grant is one of enumerated powers, it does grant to the Supreme
Court and such inferior courts as Congress may create, the entire
judicial power of the Federal Government. Section One of Article
III declares that "The judicial power of the United States shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such other inferior courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." This
is followed by Section Two, which provides in part that "the judi-
cial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under
this Constitution."
No attempt was made in the Constitution, as first adopted, to
cut down the grant of full judicial power conferred by the first sec-
tion. The remaining clauses simply designated certain subjects
which were included within the general grant of judicial power.
The Eleventh Amendment did restrict the judicial power thereto-
fore granted in one respect. It provides that the judicial power
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.
Moreover, the Seventh Amendment provides that "in suits at Com-
mon Law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dol-
lars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact tried
by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United
States than according to the rules of the Common Law."
Who can read this grant of judicial power and the Seventh
Amendment in the light of the aspirations and desires of the people
as already noted, and doubt, for one moment, that it was their design
that the National system of jurisprudence should be upbuilded
according to such rules of the Common Law as should be found
applicable? They knew of no other system. They loved the one
they had inherited. They were seeking to retain its benefits.
Socratically we ask again, how but by the rules of the Common
Law, used here in its broadest sense, was justice to be dispensed in
the United States Courts created by the Constitution? As Mr. jus-
tice Story said: "What 'but the Common Law shall furnish the guide
of decision, interpretation and restriction?" Upon the Constitution
as a framework, was the Federal Judiciary with the aid of the Com-
mon Law to build such a system of jurisprudence as should satisfy
the Nation's needs. And either consciously or unconsciously the
Federal courts, under the leadership of that greatest of all courts,
the Supreme Court of the United States, have consistently devel-
oped our National Jurisprudence along the lines which have led and
will inevitably continue to lead toward that result for which the
Fathers planned, prayed and fought.
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Before taking up for consideration some of the expressions of
the Supreme Court, both obiter and otherwise, bearing upon the
question of the Comr. n Law jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, I
shall allude briefly to the contribution of that Court toward the har-
monious development of the Common Law throughout the country.
The student of the Common Law as administered in this country
cannot but be impressed with the remarkable uniformity which has
attended the application of its principles in forty-six different States,
necessarily representing as many different jurisdictions. For that
happy result great credit is due to the willingness on the part of the
State Courts to consider, respectfully and carefully, the decisions of
the courts of sister States with a desire to produce uniformity of
law. But it should not be overlooked that the Supreme Court of
the United States has made substantial contribution thereto.
In suits at Common Law the decisions of the Supreme Court
seem, at first, to assert their independence of State decisions in the
case of Swift v. Tyson,' which was destined to create a following of
authority now impregnable. The question there raised for determi-
nation was whether a pre-existing debt was a valuable consideration
for the transfer of a draft. After a review of the cases in the New
York Courts, where the controversy arose, tending to decide the
question in the negative, Mr. Justice Story, referring to the 3 4 th
Section of the Judiciary Act, maintained that the word "laws," as
therein used, included only the statute law, saying that "in all the
various cases which have hitherto come before us for decision, this
court has uniformly supposed that the true interpretation of the
34th Section limited its application to State laws, strictly local, that
is to say, to the positive statutes of the State and the construction
thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to
things having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to
real estate, and other matters immovable and intra-territorial in their
nature and character. It never has been supposed by us that the
section did apply, or was designed to apply, to questions of a more
general nature, not at all dependent on local statutes or local usages
of a fixed and permanent operation, as, for example, to the con-
struction of ordinary contracts or other written instruments, and
especially to questions of General Commercial Law, where the State
tribunals are called upon to perform the like function as ourselves,
that is, to ascertain, upon general reasoning and legal analogies,
what is the true exposition of a contract or instrument, or what is
1. (1842) i6 Peters, i.
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the just rule furnished by the principles of Commercial Law to
govern the case."
Consistently with such expression, the Court then refused to
follow the New York decisions, and -established the affirmative of
the proposition.
During the same term in which the Court decided Swift v.
Tyson, there was presented to them for construction a contract of
insurance. This was the case of Carpenter v. Providence Ins. Co.,2
Justice Story again writing the opinion. The Court would not
follow New York or Massachusetts decisions, the position asserted
being in harmony with and strengthening the attitude shown in
Swift v. Tyson. Enforcing his former argument and extending the
rule from negotiable paper to all contracts, Justice Story said:
"The questions under our consideration are questions of General
Commercial Law, and depend upon the construction of a contract
of insurance which is by no means local in its character, or regulated
by any local policy or customs. Whatever respect therefore the
decisions of State tribunals may have on such a subject-and they
certainly are entitled to great respect-they cannot conclude the
judgment of this Court."
The rule thus firmly established was uninterruptedly called into
use. It was applied to a bill of lading in Myrick v. Michigan Cen-
tral R. R. Co.,3 the court overruling the Supreme Court of Illinois;
to a stipulation exempting a common carrier from all liability, thus
reversing the New York Courts ;4 to a question of negligence ;5 to
the interpretation of the "fellow servant" rule contrary to the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota ;" to a question of nuisance, disapprov-
ing the views of the Wisconsin courts, in which the court said :7
"This does not depend upon State statute or local State law.
The law which governs the case is the Common Law, on which this
court has never acknowledged the right of the State courts to con-
trol our decisions, except, perhaps, in a class of cases where the
State courts have established, by repeated decisions, a rule of prop-
erty in regard to land titles peculiar to the State."
Moreover, the exception in the sentence last above commands
no special favor unless the courts under review have developed a
rule firmly settled in the law. In Foxcroft v. Mallett, Webster
2. x6 Peters, 495, 51r.
3. 107 U. S. 102, 109.
4. Liverpool Steam Co. v,. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397.
5. Chicago City v. Robbins, 67 U. S., 418, 428.
6. Chicago and St. Paul R. R. Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S., 377.
7. Yates v. Milwaukee, io Wall., 497, 5o6.
8. 4 How., 352.
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argued that the court should follow the courts of Maine, which
had construed the language of a deed, for such decisions, he main-
tained, outlined a rule of property in that State. Allusion was made
in the opinion to the argument, but the court closed with the view
that such decisions "should not be regarded as conclusive on the
mere construction of a deed as to matters and language belonging
to the Common Law, and not to any local statute."
So, too, the court refused to follow a rule of evidence established
by the court of last resort of Kentucky,' and in Union Pacific Ry.
Co. v. Yates,10 the court said: "The decisions of the courts of a State
construing Common Law rules of evidence are not obligatory on the
Federal Courts."
Whether punitive damages should be allowed was the question
presented in Lake Shore R. R. v. Prentice."' The court disagree-
ing with the rule, announced by State authorities, said: "This is
a question not of local law, but of general jurisprudence, upon
which the court in the absence of express statute regulating the
subject, will exercise its own judgment, uncontrolled by the decis-
ions of the courts of the several States."
Did the limits of this paper permit, many similar decisions could
be cited, but I shall add but one more, that of Burgess v. Seligman."
The action was commenced in the Federal court for the Eastern
District of MiSsouri, the trial court holding that defendant, to whom
a corporation had transferred a large amount of its stock as collat-
eral, was not liable as a stockholder for the debts of the corporation.
The fact that the court of last resort in Missouri had held other-
wise in two cases was brought to its attention. It refused to fol-
low the State court and presented its position in these words:
"The Federal courts have an independent jurisdiction in the
administration of State laws, co-ordinate with, and not subordinate
to, that of the State courts, and are bound to exercise their ownjudgment as to the meaning and effect of those laws. The exist-
ence of two co-ordinate jurisdictions in the same territory is pecul-
iar, and the results would be anomalous and inconvenient, but for
the exercise of mutual respect and deference. . . . Acting on
these principles founded as they are on comity and good sense, the'
courts of the United States, without sacrificing their own dignity as
independent tribunals, endeavor to avoid, and in most cases do avoid,
any unseemly conflict with the well-considered decisions of State
9. Russell v. Southard, 12 How., 139.
10. 79 Fed., 584.
MI. 147 U. S. xo6.
12. r07 U. S., 20.
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courts. As, however, the very object of giving to the National
courts jurisdiction to administer the laws of the States in contro-
versies between citizens of different States was to institute inde-
pendent tribunals which it might be supposed would be unaffected
by local prejudices and sectional views, it would be a dereliction of
their duty not to exercise an independent judgment in cases not
foreclosed by previous adjudication."
As we have seen the cases cited embrace commercial and mer-
cantile papers, contracts, negligence, nuisance, evidence and damages.
They have been selected because they show that the Supreme Court
has recognized the right and the duty to announce what the true
rule of the Common Law is whenever the question is presented,
although their determination differs from that of the State courts
where the controversy arose. Carefully considered as are the decis-
ions of that court when it feels called upon to differ with the decis-
ions of State courts, whether upon a direct review of such courts or
of the Federal courts, it is readily apparent that its influence in the
harmonious development of the law is immeasurable.
Further,these cases show,as do the great majority of the decis-
ions of the Supreme Court, that the Federal courts have been both
diligent and effective in applying and at the same time in broaden-
ing and developing the Common Law in accord with the intent of
the framers.
How, then, has it happened that the impression has found lodge-
ment in many minds that the United States courts have not em-
ployed Common Law principles and precedents in the development
of National Law? The answer is simple, but it is at the same time
conclusive, as authority will show. It is due to the unfortunate
remark of Mr. Justice McLean in Wheaton v. Peters,13 decided in
1834. The learned Justice said: "It is clear there can be no Com-
mon Law of the United States. . . . The Common Law could
be made a part of our Federal system only -by legislative adoption.
When, therefore, a Common Law right is asserted, we must look to
the State in which the controversy originated." This statement
was clearly obiter for the case turns on the point that Congress by
the Act of 1790, instead of sanctioning an existing right at Common
Law as contended for (the literary property of an author in his
works after publication), created that right, and the rights of the
complainant must be sustained if at all under that act. This posi-
tion was all that was needed for a decision. Whether there existed
at one time such a Common Law right of authors in England or
13. 8 Peters, 591-658.
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America was immaterial, and discussion of the inductive questions
presented in the English cases of Millar v. Taylor4 and Donaldson
v. Beckett'5 was not germane, for the vital questions in those cases
were similarly decided, i. e., that since the Statute of 8 Anne that
statute controlled the rights of authors in that country.
Wheaton v. Peters was decided early in 1834. At this time the
question of State rights was a paramount subject. It was only in
the year before, 1833, that Webster and Calhoun had engaged in
vehement debate in the Senate on the Force Bill, and Webster made
his famous speech in opposition to the position that the Union was
a mere compact. It may well be that the discussion prevalent may
have suggested the dicta in this case.
In saying that the statement of Mr. Justice McLean was unfor-
tunate I do not mean that it thereby became the law, for it did not;
or that it prevented the Federal courts from availing themselves of
our great storehouse of Common Law principles, for it had no such
effect. It was obiter, and was ever afterward so treated by the
Supreme Court. Indeed, his remark was destined never to be quoted
again by that court. Not even as a step in the upbuilding of an
argument by the court has it ever been permitted a place. That
fact has great significance to the lawyer who appreciates the wide
familiarity of the Bench and the Bar with the first case to consider
the effect of the copyright statute. In a few instances, it is true, the
reasoning of Mr. Justice McLean upon this subject has been
referred to by his successors, but never once in approval of his
language.
What is treated as the substance and effect of his position-
but which, indeed, is very far from it-is to be found in Smith v.
Alabama.'6 It is interesting to note that this case had not to do
with the Common Law even in the remotest degree. The question
there presented was whether a statute of the State of Alabama pro-
viding for the examination and licensing of engineers engaged in
operating locomotive engines in that State was void as applied to
engineers running interstate trains, on the ground that it was an
attempt to regulate interstate commerce. Hence, the question of
the Common Law jurisdiction of Federal courts was not discussed
by counsel, and probably not considered by the court as it did not
present the point of decision. Therefore, it happened, 'as it quite
often happens when the judge writes about matters not discussed
14. 4 Burr, 2303.
15. 4 Burr, 2408.
6. 124 U. S., 465, 478.
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orally or in brief by counsel, and in turn followed by debate with
associates around the consultation table-he wrote too broadly. He
corrected as far as an obiter can ever correct one blunder in the
Wheaton v. Peters obiter. He repudiated by indirection the sugges-
tion that the United States courts have no Common Law and can
have none except by legislative adoption. This was accomplished
by citing Wheaton v. Peters as authority for a very different propo-
sition, viz.: that "there is no Common Law of the United States in
the sense of a national customary law distinct from the Common
Law of England as adopted by the several States each for itself,
applied as its local law, and subject to such alteration as may be
provided by its own Statutes."
This admits necessarily what Chief Justice Marshall asserted
in the beginning of the court's history, that the court applies and
enforces the Common Law. But the learned justice seemed to
deem it important to give the assurance that the Common Law thus
utilized is not a new creation, but the Common Law of England as
adopted in the States. In other words, that the Common Law,
enforced by the Federal courts, is the Common Law of England so
far as applicable, and not separate and distinct from that law which
might be called a National Customary Law. A few sentences far-
ther along, but on the same page, he proceeds to show the inaccu-
racy of the opening phrase of the sentence quoted and which I now
repeat, "There is no Common Law of the United States, in the sense
of a Nati6nal Customary Law." The contradictory sentence is,
"There is, however, one clear exception to the statement that there
is no National Common Law. The interpretation of the Constitu-
tion of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that
its provisions are framed in the language of the English Common
Law, and are to be read in the light of its history. The code of
constitutional and statutory construction, which, therefore, is grad-
ually formed by the judgments of this Court, in the application of
the Constitution and the laws and treaties made in pursuance
thereof, has for its basis so much of the Common Law as may be
implied in the subject, and constitutes a Common Law resting on
National authority."
Considered together these several propositions seem to mean
that the Federal courts are constantly applying the Common
Law rules and precedents of England and of this country to any
appropriate situtation. When differing from a State court's con-
ception of a Common Law rule, we (the court says) are correctly
applying the same Common Law that the State court in our view
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incorrectly attempted to apply. Our decisions construing the Con-
stitution-framed in the language of the English Common Law-
and the Statutes passed, in pursuance thereof, have gradually
builded for National purposes solely what may be termed a Common
Law existing on National authority. But it in no wise conflicts
with the general Common Law of England and this country. It
is rather an extension of the Common Law to meet the require-
ments of the Constitution and Congressional legislation in pursu-
ance thereof. If I am correct in my conclusion as to the thought
which the learned Justice intended to convey, then this dictum is in
harmony, not only with the practice of the Federal courts, but also
with their carefully expressed opinions, as I shall later show.
I have already called attention to a number of cases in which the
Supreme Court has differed with State courts as to the true rule of
the Common Law.
In United States v. Wong Kim Ark,'17 the court had to determine
whether Wong Kim Ark was a citizen of the United States. The
court said: "The Constitution nowhere defines the meaning of these
words. . . . In this as in other respects, it must be interpreted
in the light of the Common Law, the principles and history of which
were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution.' s The
language of the Constitution as has been well said could not be well
understood without reference to the Common Law." The Constitu-
tion and the several amendments contain many provisions to which
that opinion applies with equal force. Take the Fifth Amendment
as an illustration. It provides in part that "no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
This amendment applies to the Federal Government only as has
been decided many times. It was intended to operate as a restraint
upon its power. It forbade the Federal Government from doing
what every State Constitution forbade its Government from doing-
which in turn but adapted a restraint upon government that was
secured by the Great Charter. But how were the Federal courts
to determine what constituted due process of law? By the Common
Law of course, which through many decisions covering a period
of centuries had come to be thoroughly settled and well understood.
Kohl v. United States'9 presented the question whether the
United States could exercise the right of eminent domain to acquire
17. 169 U. S.. 649.
18. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall, 162; Ex. parte Wilson, iI4 U. S., 117;
Boyd v. United States, x16 U. S., 616-624-5.
19. 91 U. S., 367.
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a site for a post-office. The court said: "When the power to establish
post-offices and to create courts within the States was conferred
upon the Federal Government, included in it was authority to obtain
sites for such offices and for court-houses, and to obtain them by
such means as were known and appropriate. The right of eminent
domain was one of those means, well known when the Constitution
was adopted, and employed to obtain lands for public uses. Its
existence, therefore, in the grantee of that power, ought not to be
questioned. . . . The right of eminent domain always was a
right at Common Law. It was not a right in equity, nor was it
even the creature of a statute. The time of its exercise may have
been prescribed by statute, but the right itself was superior to any
statute. . . . It is difficult, then, to see why a proceeding to
take land by virtue of the Government's eminent domain, and deter-
mining the compensation to be made for it, is not, within the mean-
ing of the statute, a suit at Common Law, when initiated in a court.
It is an attempt to enforce a legal right."
One of the most forceful illustrations of the fact that the Gov-
ernment of the United States does recognize and enforce the prin-
ciples of the Common Law with regard to matters within national
control is to be found in the organization of the Court of Claims.
It has jurisdiction to determine claims against the United States
arising in any State or Territory. It is the one court in the Union,
therefore, that deals at all times with matters of national concern
arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. The
statute creating it contains no provision as to rules of evidence. On
an appeal to the Supreme Court in Moore v. United States,20 the
question presented was whether the Court had erred in admitting
evidence. The Court said, Mr. Justice Bradley writing:
"In my opinion, it must be governed by law; and we know of no
system of law by which it should be governed other than the Com-
mon Law. That is the system from which our judicial ideas and
legal definitions are derived. The language of the Constitution
and many Acts of Congress could not be understood without refer-
ence to the Common Law. The great majority of the contracts and
transactions which come before the Court of Claims for adjudication
are permeated and are to be adjudged by the principles of the Com-
mon Law."
The question we are discussing came before the Court in Mur-
ray v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.21 in an action to recover damages
for alleged unreasonable rates ciarged for transportation of
20. 91 U. S., 270.
21. 62 Fed., 24.
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freight. In an able and exhaustive opinion Judge Shiras reviewed
the history of the Common Law in England and in this country and
many of the decisions of the Supreme Court, stating his deductions
therefrom as follows:
"The conclusion I reach upon this subject is that at the time of
the separation of the colonies from the mother country, and at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution, there was in existence a
common law, derived from the Common Law of England, and mod-
ified to suit the surroundings of the people; that the adoption of the
Constitution and consequent creation of a National Government did
not abrogate this Common Law; that the division of governmental
powers and duties between the National and State governments
provided for in the Constitution did not deprive the people who
formed the Constitution of the benefits of the Common Law; that,
as to such matters as were by the Constitution committed to the con-
trol of the National Government, there were applicable thereto the
Law of Nations, the Maritime Law, the Principles of Equity, and
the Common Law, according to the nature of the particular matter;
that, to secure the enforcement of these several systems when appli-
cable, the Constitution and Congress, acting in furtherance of its
provisions, have created the Supreme Court of the United States
and the other courts inferior thereto, and have conferred upon
these courts the right and power to enforce the principles of the law
of nations, of the law maritime, of the system of equity, and of the
common law in all cases coming within the jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral courts, applying, in each instance, the system which the nature
of the case demands; that, as to all matters of national importance
over which paramount legislative control is conferred upon Con-
gress, the courts of the United States (the Supreme Court being the
final arbiter) have the right to declare what are the rules deducible
from the principles of general jurisprudence which control the given
case, and to define the duties and obligations of the parties thereto;
that the Common Law now applicable to matters committed to the
control of the National Government is based upon the Common Law
of England, as modified by the surroundings of the colonists, and as
developed by the growth of our institutions since the adoption of
the Constitution, and the changes in the business habits and methods
of our people."
His opinion is cited with approval in Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Call Publishing Co.,2 2 in which it was held that the principles of the
Common Law operate upon all interstate commercial transactions
except so far as they are modified by congressional enactment.
This important case set at rest the doubt and questioning which
have been occasioned by the unfortunate obiter in Wheaton v.
Peters. In order to show that the question was squarely presented
and as squarely passed upon by a unanimous court, a brief statement
'22. I1 U. S., 92.
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of the case will be made. The plaintiff claiming to have been
unjustly discriminated against, received in the State court of
Nebraska a judgment for excessive telegraph charges. The con-
tention of the telegraph company as stated by Mr. Justice Brewer,
is that the service which it rendered to the publishing company was
a matter of interstate commerce; that Congress has sole jurisdiction
over such matters, but had not at the time the service was rendered
prescribed any regulations concerning them; that there is ndl
National Common Law, and the Statute or Common Law of
Nebraska is immaterial, and hence there could be no recovery. In
discussing the question, the Court conceded, of course, that Con-
gress had jurisdiction to regulate, but had not done so. That left
the question whether there could be a recovery at Common Law.
The Court then considered the contention of counsel that there is
no Federal Common Law and after quoting from Smith v. Alabama,
hereinbefore discussed, said: "Properly understood, no exceptions
can be taken to declarations of this kind. There is no body of Fed-
eral Common Law separate and distinct from the Common Law
existing in the several States in the sense that there is a body of
statute law enacted by Congress separate and distinct from the body
of statute law enacted by the several States. But it is an entirely
different thing to hold that there is no Common Law in force gen-
erally throughout the United States, and that the countless multi-
tude of interstate commercial transactions are subject to no rules
and burdened by no restrictions other than those expressed in the
Statutes of Congress." The Court then asked the question, "What
is the Common Law ?" and after answering it continued, "Can it be
that the great multitude of interstate commercial transactions are
freed from the burdens created by the Common Law, as so defined,
and are subject to no rule except that to be found in the Statutes of
Congress? We are clearly of opinion that this cannot be so, and
that the principles of the Common Law are operative upon all inter-
state commercial transactions except so far as they are modified by
congressional enactment." And the Court added: "But this ques-
tion is not a new one in this Court," citing Interstdte Commerce
Commission v. B. & 0. R. R. Co.,23 and Bank of Kentucky v. Adams
Express Co.24 This case is of course decisive and controlling and
sweeps away the last vestige of opportunity for further mis-educa-
tion by the obiter in Wheaton v. Peters.
But there is another decision by the same court, handed down
23. 145 U. S., 263-275.
24. 93 U. S., 174.
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May i 3 th last,25 still more interesting in its facts; one that furnishes
as striking an illustration as can be found in the books in justifica-
tion of the proud boast of the devotees of the Common Law, that
through the application of its principles either on the law side of the
court or in equity, any controversy that can possibly arise can be
solved. The suit was brought in the Federal courts by the State
of Kansas against the State of Colorado. As it involves a contro-
versy between two States, jurisdiction is expressly conferred by
Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution. And the subject of
dispute being justiciable in its nature, the Federal courts have full
power to decide it, for Section i of Article III granted to the Fed-
eral courts all of the judicial power of the National Government.
Kansas claims that Colorado, through corporations created by it
and acting under its laws, is diverting the waters of the Arkansas
River for the irrigation of lands in Colorado. The river not being
navigable in Kansas, the claim is not that navigability is affected,
but that Colorado has not the right to diminish the volume of water
flowing into the State of Kansas.
By the Ordinance of 1787 the Common Law was extended over
the territory covered by both States. When they became States
each succeeded to the right to supersede the Common Law with
statutes. Colorado did so, and Kansas did not. The local law,
therefore, in each State is different, but neither could impose its law
on the other.
But the controversy, being justiciable, was solvable, and has
been solved in accordance with the dictates of good conscience,
solved without precedent, as many other questions have been solved
in the upbuilding of the Common Law. By it a precedent of great
value has been created, one through which will be determined in the
years to come other controversies between States. In its opinion,
as one of the necessary steps leading inevitably to the conclusion
reached by it, the Court referred to the argument, apparently again
renewed in that case, that "it has been said that there is no Common
Law of the United States, as distinguished from the Common Law
of the several States."
But the Court replied in substance: That same contention was
made in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co.,2 and we
there answered it (in the language I have already quoted). And the
error resulting from a little carelessness in writing was again, and
for all time, stricken down. One quotation from this great decision
25. Kansas v. Colorado, 2o6 U. S., 46. (See Comment, p. 47-Ed.)
26. 181 U. S., 92.
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let me add without comment. It has in a way been anticipated in
this article and before reading the Kansas and Colorado case:
"One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the States to
each other, is that of equality of right. Each State stands on the
same level with all the rest. It can impose its own legislation
or no one of the others, and is bound to yield its own views to
none. Yet, whenever, as in the case of Missouri v. Illinois,
2
T
the action of one State reaches through the agency of natural laws
into the territory of another State, the question of the extent and
the limitations of the rights of the two States becomes a matter of
justiciable dispute between them, and this Court is called upon to
settle that dispute in such a way as will recognize the equal rights
of both and at the same time establish justice between them. In
other words, through these successive disputes and decisions this
Court is practically building up what may not improperly be called
Interstate Common Law."
The student of our jurisprudence, when he first learns that here,
as in England, the Common Law can solve and justly solve every
problem in civil life, if permitted to do so, must compare with won-
der and amazement the 25,000 pages of law annually placed upon
our statute books, with the 46 general and the 246 special laws
passed by England's Parliament in five years, although legislating
for a home population of forty-two millions and for millions of
dependents; and his wonder must deepen as he listens to the noisy
acclaim of those who would destroy the local authority of the
States and centralize all power in the Federal Government. The
justification pleaded for overthrowing the governmental construc-
tion of the Fathers-that in that direction salvation lies from the
wrongs the public have suffered-must seem so trivial as to be con-
temptible in the light of the fact that the Federal Government could
have checked the abuses relating to interstate commerce before stat-
utes were passed by Congress, had it undertaken to do so. The
authorities I have cited demonstrate that proposition. The law
therefore was adequate and the courts efficient-but the Federal
Law officers were either inadequately equipped or unreasonably
restrained.
There is activity now, it is true, but it is due to frequent applica-
tions of the whip and spur of the President. But there is also
activity in the State governments-indeed, quite as much in some
of them as in the Federal Government. All the difference then that
there is between the two is that, after neglecting their duty for
27. ISo U. S., 20S
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many years, the Federal Government started first. But that fact
was due to the man who was temporarily at the head of it, not
because virtue inheres in the Federal rather than in the State gov-
ernments.
Certainly no one will pretend that a scheme of government
which has been found workable for more than a century should be
overturned because of the manifestations of a special zeal for good
works begotten after re-election by a single occupant of the office.
But the campaign against the governmental plan of the Fathers
is on and has been for several years. It has for its leader the most
accomplished politician of our history. Behind him and backing
him stand these great corporations of the country which are engaged
in interstate commerce and insurance. Their reason is that it is
easier to deal with one government than with many. It is not their
purpose to submit proposed amendments of the Constitution to the
people as the Constitution provides-a procedure with which no one
could find fault, as it offers an opportunity for discussion before the
people prior to their action. Rather it is their scheme to accom-
plish the centralization of power by unconstitutional, and therefore
dishonest, methods. These include: (i) Congressional legislation
assuming powers not granted, but expressly retained either to the
States or the people; (2) Executive exercise of powers not granted,
and the seizure in one form or another of powers belonging to
other departments of government; and (3) The substitution of stat-
utes for Common Law.
Statutes are inflexible and cannot be expanded by judicial decis-
ions. Legislators and executives, therefore, who are filled with the
desire to control and regulate men and affairs, find in a statute the
ideal method of accomplishing their wishes. The objectibn to an
over-abundance of legislation by those who desire justice, rather
than personal control, is that the men who draft the statutes cannot
foresee the cases that will arise which do not come within the letter
of the statute. It is for the opposite reason that the Common Law
is so dear to t1be hearts of all students of it. It is flexible. It can
be made applicable to every new condition which may arise and in
every instance can be worked out according to the eternal principles
of justice.
Herein we find a reason for the action on the part of those inter-
ested in the scheme to centralize power in the Federal Government.
It was their theory that so long as Congress omitted to legislate
with reference to interstate commerce, that there was no law to pro-
tect those who were wronged by those engaged in interstate corn-
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merce. But as we have seen, the Supreme Court decided that they
were mistaken; that the Common Law did apply and would con-
tinue to apply until Congress should by legislation supersede some or
any portion of it by its statutes.
Thus it happens that in both State and National governments,
whenever there arise controversies which are not within the pur-
view of statutes, they are still governed by law. And that law is
the Common Law, as to which we may with all our hearts agree
with John Adams, when in 1783, he said: "That the liberty, the
unalienable, indefeasible rights of men, the honor and dignity of
human nature, the grandeur and glory of the public, and the univer-
sal happiness of individuals, were never so fully and successfully
consulted as in this most excellent monument of human art, the
Common Law of England."
ALTON B. PARKER.
